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CONSTRUING THE PELLY AND PACKWOOD-MAGNUSON
AMENDMENTS: THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT HARPOONS
EXECUTIVE DISCRETION-American Cetacean Society v.
Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Japan
Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 106 S. Ct. 787
(1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955).
The United States has been in the forefront of the movement to protect
whales from commercial exploitation for over twenty years. Since the late
1960's, government agencies and private organizations have worked to-
gether to end commercial whaling. But, in 1984, the Department of
Commerce and the pro-whaling Japanese government concluded an agree-
ment' that allows Japanese whalers to exceed the sperm whale quota
established by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) by a limited
amount for four years without sanctions by the United States in exchange
for an agreement to honor the International Whaling Commission's com-
mercial moratorium by 1987.2 The agreement has angered members of
Congress and antiwhaling organizations, and has created a controversy that
may impair United States-Japanese relations.
Before the United States and Japan concluded the agreement, con-
servation organizations filed suit in federal court against the Secretaries of
Commerce and State. 3 They sought an injunction requiring the Secretary of
1. An exchange of letters between the Secretary of Commerce and the Charge d'Affaires ad interim
of Japan confirmed the agreement that, inter alia, specified quotas for commercial whaling for the North
Pacific sperm whale stock (western division). Letter from Secretary Baldrige to Charge d'Affaires
Murazumi and Summary of Discussions (November 13, 1984) (confirming the whaling agreement)
(copy on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Baldrige Letter]; Letter from
Charge d'Affaires Murazumi to Secretary Baldrige (November 13, 1984) (confirming the whaling
agreement) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
2. The agreement allows the Japanese to take 400 sperm whales per year for the 1984 and 1985
coastal seasons, and 200 whales per year for the 1986 and 1987 seasons. Baldrige Letter (Summary of
Discussions), supra note 1, at 2-3. The International Whaling Commission (IWC), see infra note 10,
had established a quota of zero for the season. See infra note 29.
Another provision of the agreement addressed Japan's objection to an indefinite commercial whaling
moratorium beginning in the 1986 season. See INTERNMATIONAL WHALING COMM'N, 33D RPoRT 21
(1983). For a discussion of the commercial moratorium, see infra note 32. The agreement specified that
if Japan withdrew its objection to the moratorium by April 1, 1985, limited its whale harvest for the 1986
and 1987 whaling seasons to the quotas set out in the agreement, and ceased all commercial whaling in
subsequent seasons pursuant to the moratorium, the United States would not certify Japan for its 1986
and 1987 whaling. Baldrige Letter (Summary of Discussions), supra note 1, at 2-3. Japan withdrew its
objection to the commercial whaling moratorium on April 5, 1985, but the withdrawal is effective only
if the American Cetacean decision, American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398
(D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955), is reversed on
appeal. Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
3. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other
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Commerce to certify the Japanese under the Pelly Amendment to the
Fisherman's Protective Act 4 and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to
the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act. 5 They also
asked the court to order the Secretary of State to impose sanctions on Japan
under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. Finally, the plaintiffs sought
a permanent injunction preventing the Secretary of Commerce from failing
to certify Japan for future violations of IWC whaling quotas. 6
The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court
declared that the Secretary of Commerce has no discretion to refuse
certifying the Japanese for exceeding the IWC sperm whaling quota. The
court permanently enjoined the Secretary from agreeing not to certify, and
from failing to certify, any Japanese whaling activities exceeding IWC
quotas. The court ordered the Secretary to certify the Japanese sperm
whaling under both the Pelly and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 7
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court decision on slightly different grounds. 8 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and will hear the case during the 1985-86 term. 9
A careful examination of the whaling agreement, the Pelly and the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, and the circuit court decision sug-
gests that the Supreme Court should reverse the appellate court's decision
because the agreement is consistent with the amendments and the Secretary
of Commerce had discretion not to certify the Japanese in this case.
grounds, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955). The complaint named the Secretaries of
Commerce and State as defendants because they are crucial parties to the determination of violations
and sanctions under the legislative scheme. See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982)). Certification of a
country by the Secretary of Commerce occurs after the Secretary has determined that the whaling
activities of the country have diminished the effectiveness of an international conservation program.
Certification triggers automatic sanctions under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment and discretion-
ary sanctions under the Pelly Amendment. See infra note 26.
5. Pub. L. No. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407 (1979) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1982)). The
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment requires the Secretary of Commerce to certify foreign fishing
operations that "diminish the effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling." Id. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i). The Pelly Amendment has a similar provision. 22 U.S.C.
§ 1978(a)(1) (1982).
6. American Cetacean Soc'y, 604 F. Supp. at 1401.
7. Id. at 1411.
8. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub
nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955).
9. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955)
(granting certiorari).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The International Whaling Commission
The controversy between the United States and Japan stems from an IWC
quota. The IWC was created to conserve whales for current and future
use. 10 Representatives of member nations establish whale catch limits, or
quotas, at annual IWC meetings." The quotas are normally based on
recommendations by the Scientific Committee of the IWC. 12 The quotas
are binding 13 if accepted by a three-fourths majority of the representa-
tives. 14
The IWC quotas have had only a limited effect on harvest levels. The
IWC has no power to impose sanctions for quota violations. 15 More
importantly, any member of the IWC may exempt itself from an otherwise
binding quota by objecting to the quota within ninety days of its passage. 16
The quota, effective for all nonobjecting members, does not bind the
objecting country until the objection is withdrawn. 17
10. The International Whaling Commission (IWC) was created by The International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling, December2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72
[hereinafter cited as Whaling Convention]. The Whaling Convention is a multilateral attempt to balance
whaling and conservation interests. The purposes of the Whaling Convention are to conserve whales for
future generations, to protect whales from overfishing, to manage whale resources for maximum
exploitation without endangerment, and to achieve the optimum level of whale resources without
serious disruption of the whaling industry. Whaling Convention, supra, Preamble, 62 Stat. at 1716,
T.I.A.S. No. 1849 at 2,161 U.N.T.S. at 74. See also Christol, Schmidhauser & Totten, TheLaw andthe
Whale: CurrentDevelopments in the International Whaling Controversy, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAw
149, 152 (1976).
11. Whaling Convention, supra note 10, art. V, para. l(e), 62 Stat. at 1718, T.I.A.S. No. 1849 at4,
161 U.N.T.S. at 80.
12. The Scientific Committee is composed of marine scientists from member nations. Since the
early 1970's, the Scientific Committee has performed a crucial role in the determination of stock quotas.
The Committee, after intensive analysis of records of whale counts, migration patterns, reproductive
capacities, and other factors, recommends a quota based on its best judgment of the needs of the
particular whale stock. These recommendations are generally given great weight by IWC commis-
sioners in establishing stock quotas. See Hearing on the Preparations for the 34th IWC Meeting Before
the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1982) (statement of Mr. John Byrne, Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; United States Commissioner to the 1WC) [hereinafter cited
as Preparations for the 34th IWC].
13. Whaling Convention, supra note 10, art. V, para. 3, 62Stat. at 1719, T.I.A.S. No. 1849 at5,161
U.N.T.S. at 80, 82.
14. Id., art. III, para. 2, 62 Stat. at 1717, T.I.A.S. No. 1849 at 3, 161 U.N.T.S. at 78.
15. Id., art. IX, paras. 1, 3, 62 Stat. at 1720, T.I.A.S. No. 1849 at 6, 161 U.N.T.S. at 84. The
Whaling Convention assigns responsibility for imposing sanctions for infractions to the member
government under whose jurisdiction the infraction occurred.
16. Id., art. V, para. 3, 62 Stat. at 1719, T.I.A.S. No. 1849 at 5, 161 U.N.T.S. at 80, 82.
17. Id. Technically, a state that has objected to a quota does not then "violate" it when the state
exceeds it. For semantic simplicity, however, this Note will use "violation" to include exceeding a
quota after an objection, unless otherwise noted.
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For years these limitations on enforcement frustrated the IWC's initial
attempts at reducing whale quotas.18 The limitations have become more
significant since the early 1970's as the IWC has begun to focus on
conserving and preserving whale stocks through responsible management
and restrictions on the whaling industry. 19
18. Japan and other principal whaling nations persistently resisted conservation efforts within the
IWC. Christol, Schmidhauser & Totten, supra note 10, at 153. See also Scarff, The International
Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment (Part One), 6
ECOLOGY L.Q. 323, 358-71 (1977) (brief history of the IWC from 1947-76). In addition, many
members of the IWC were represented at the meetings by individuals actively affiliated with the
whaling industry. Christol, Schmidhauser & Totten, supra note 10, at 154. As a result, the IWC was
widely and accurately perceived as a whaling club concerned with allocating the remaining declining
stocks of whales among themselves while one species after another became endangered. Smith, The
International Whaling Commission: An Analysis of the Past and Reflections on the Future, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 543, 553 (1984).
19. By the early 1970's there was widespread public appreciation that the whaling industry, with
the tacit support of the IWC, had been severely overhunting whale populations while showing
negligible concern for their survival. Smith, supra note 18, at 554. The desperate condition of many
whale stocks made it apparent that the IWC could not continue to operate as it had since its inception.
In June 1972, at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 110 nations, including
the United States, adopted a resolution calling for improved whale management. The resolution called
for an international cooperative effort to strengthen the IWC, increase whale research, and adopt a ten-
year whaling moratorium. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(Stockholm), A/Conf.48/14/Rev. I at 12 (June 5-16, 1972) (Recommendation No. 33). The Secretary-
General of the United Nations Conference personally presented the resolution to the IWC and rebuked
the IWC for its abuse of whale resources. INTERNATIONAL WHALING CoMM'N, 24TH REPoRT 23-24
(1974).
The IWC rejected the United Nations Conference proposal. Nevertheless, conservationists achieved
significant success in whale protection during the early 1970's. Scarff, supra note 18, at 368. Changes
toward a conservationist policy within the IWC included a gradual shift in IWC membership towards an
antiwhaling majority, the emerging significance of the Scientific Committee in the determination of
quotas, the start of annual introductions of a resolution calling for a ten-year or indefinite moratorium,
and dramatic reductions in whale quotas. See generally id. at 323-427.
The United States has played a leading role in conservation efforts within and without the IWC since
the early 1970's. Congress has passed several laws to protect whales independently of IWC regulations.
The Endangered Species Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, §§ 1-5, 83 Stat. 275, (codified as amended
in 1973 at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982)), prohibits all trade in whales with the United States. See 16
U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1982). The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, tit. 1,
§ 101, 86 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-77 (1982)), imposes a moratorium on
the domestic exploitation of marine mammals. The Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1982), allows the President to embargo fish-product imports from nations
disregarding international whaling conservation programs. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying
text; see also Note, Legal Aspects of the International Whaling Controversy: Will Jonah Swallow the
Whales?, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 211, 225-33 (1975).
Furthermore, since 1971 Congress annually has passed resolutions supporting a complete commer-
cial whaling moratorium. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 115, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 22,668-69
(1971). See also H.R. Con. Res. 387, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 38,536-40 (1971).
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B. United States Domestic Legislation: Teeth for the IWC
Congress passed the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman Protective Act
in the early 1970's.20 The amendment states that the Secretary of Com-
merce shall "certify" to the President any country conducting fishing
operations that "diminish the effectiveness" of an international fisheries
conservation program.21 The President then has sixty days in which to
decide whether to impose sanctions on the offending country.22
The Pelly Amendment provided the IWC with teeth to enforce its
resolutions, albeit indirectly and at the discretion of the United States
government. The Pelly Amendment diminished abusive whaling practices
and encouraged whaling nations to join the IWC. 23
By 1979, however, congressional pressure to modify the Pelly Amend-
ment had grown. The President had never imposed sanctions on certified
countries, and this record appeared to encourage whaling nations to dis-
regard the amendment and IWC regulations. 24 The congressional solution
was the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fisheries Conservation
and Management Act.25
20. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982). While originally introduced to address a dispute with Denmark over
Atlantic salmon fishing, see infra note 53 and accompanying text, the amendment's principal utility has
been its application to whaling. See H.R. REP. No. 1029,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1768, 1770.
21. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1982).
22. Id. § 1978(b). Sanctions under this amendment consist of a prohibition on importation of fish
products into the United States from the offending country for as long as the President deems
appropriate, and to the extent allowed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Id. § 1978(a)(3).
23. The first use of the Pelly Amendment was in 1974 after Japan and the Soviet Union exceeded the
IWC quota for the 1973 Antarctic minke whale season. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
Due to the countries' subsequent conciliatory actions, sanctions were not imposed. See infra notes 106,
108. Several years later, numerous nonmember whaling nations were certified under the Pelly Amend-
ment to pressure them to join the IWC. See infra note 134.
24. Congress heard testimony that the failure to impose sanctions after certification encouraged
nations to view the amendment as a "paper tiger" and to violate IWC resolutions whenever it benefitted
them. Fisheries Conservation and Management Act Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 327 (1979) (statement of Patricia Forkan, Vice President for
Program Coordination for the Humane Society of the United States) [hereinafter cited as FCMA
Oversight Hearings]. Members of Congress asserted that the Pelly Amendment had been used
ineffectively because sanctions were not imposed even under "justifiable circumstances." Id. at 323
(statement of Rep. Bonker). The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment was meant to correct this "defect."
Id. See also Hearings on Whaling Policy and International Whaling Commission Oversight Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1979) (statement of Rep. Oberstar) (the
only way to stop unregulated killing of whales is to link the Pelly Amendment to fishing privileges in the
United States 200-mile fisheries zone) [hereinafter cited as Whaling Policy and IWC Oversight
Hearing].
25. See 125 CoNG. REc. 22,083-84 (1979) (statement of Rep. Oberstar). See also FCMA Oversight
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The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment automatically imposes sanctions
on a country once the Secretary of Commerce has certified to the President
that the country is diminishing the effectiveness of the Whaling Conven-
tion. Certification under Packwood-Magnuson is patterned after certifica-
tion under the Pelly Amendment. 26 The sanction consists of a reduction of
at least fifty percent in the country's catch of fish within the United States
fisheries management zone.27 The President has no discretion to avoid or
defer imposing the sanction under this amendment. Congress hoped that
the automatic sanction would deter flagrant violations of IWC whaling
quotas.28
C. The Present Controversy: Japan's Sperm Whale Catch
At its 36th meeting in 1984, the IWC affirmed a zero quota for North
Pacific sperm whales (western division) for the 1984-85 season. 29 The
Hearings, supra note 24, at 323 (statement of Rep. Bonker).
26. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1982) (Pelly Amendment) with 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)
(1982) (Packwood-Magnuson Amendment); see also 125 CONG. REc.22,083 (1979) (statement of Rep.
Oberstar); S. REP. No. 72, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979); FCMA Oversight Hearings, supra note 24, at
317. Certification follows a finding by the Secretary of Commerce that a state is diminishing the
effectiveness of the Whaling Convention or, under the Pelly Amendment, that a country is diminishing
the effectiveness of any international fisheries conservation program. FCMA Oversight Hearings,
supra note 24, at 312.
The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment differs from the Pelly Amendment in several ways. The
sanctions under the two amendments differ, see supra note 22, infra note 27, and are automatic under
Packwood-Magnuson but discretionary under Pelly, see 125 CONG. REc. 22,083 (1979) (statement of
Rep. Breaux). Also, a certification under Packwood-Magnuson is also a certification under Pelly, but
the reverse is not necessarily true. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment states that "[a] certification
under this section shall also be deemed a certification for the purposes of [the Pelly Amendment]." 16
U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i) (1982). The Pelly Amendment does not contain corresponding language. See
22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982). Finally, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment pertains only to acts dimin-
ishing the effectiveness of the Whaling Convention, while the Pelly Amendment concerns the diminish-
ing of any international fishery conservation program plus any international program for endangered or
threatened species.
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B) (1982). The Secretary of State, afterconsulting with the Secretary of
Commerce, determines the size of the reduction in the fish catch quota.
28. See 125 CONG. REC. 22,084 (1979) (statement of Rep. Oberstar). See also id. at 21,743
(statement of Sen. Magnuson). Only one certification has occured under either amendment since the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment took effect, see infra note 146 and accompanying text, even though
the IWC has increasingly passed antiwhaling, preservationist resolutions over the opposition of its now-
minority whaling members, and even though more serious violations of quotas and other IWC
resolutions have occurred. See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
29. The IWC never actually voted for a quota for the season. Instead it relied on an unusual
procedure to prohibit sperm whaling. The usual procedure for setting a stock quota begins with a
recommendation for a quota by the IWC's Scientific Committee. See supra note 12. But at the 1981 IWC
meeting, the Committee did not recommend a quota for the North Pacific sperm whale stock because it
could not adequately estimate the population of the stock. Rather than setting a quota without a
recommendation from the Committee, the IWC passed a resolution stating that "no whales may be
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Japanese, however, objected to the quota; under IWC rules they are thus not
bound by it.30 Japan then exceeded the quota during the following whaling
season.
31
When it became apparent that Japan would exceed the sperm whale
quota, the United States notified Japan of the possibility of certification and
sanctions under the Pelly and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendments.
Subsequent negotiations led to an executive agreement that permitted
limited harvesting through the 1987 season and required the government of
Japan to withdraw its objection to the 1WC sperm whale quota and the
complete commercial moratorium. 32 The Secretary of Commerce agreed
not to certify Japan's sperm whaling if Japan conformed to these provisions
even though Japan, in fact, would be exceeding the IWC quota.
II. THE COURT CHALLENGE: AMERICAN CETACEAN SOCIETY
v. BALDRGE
Prior to the final agreement, a number of environmental and whale
preservation organizations had already challenged the United States-Jap-
anese negotiations. The groups filed a complaint in federal district court to
taken from thie] stock until catch limits. -are established by the Commission." INTERNATIONAL
WHALING COMM'N, 33D REPoRr9, table 3 n.1 (1983). This resolutioncreated a zero quota. Review of the
33d Int'l Whaling Comm'n MeetingBefore the Subcomm. on HumanRights and Int'l Org. of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1981) (statement of Thomas Garrett, Deputy
United States Commissioner to the IWC) [hereinafter cited as Review of the 33d1WC]. See infra notes
114-16 and accompanying text for discussion on theprocedureby which-the IWC established the sperm
whale quota, and the Scientific Committee's opinion that the quota was not needed to protect sperm
whales.
At the next meeting, the IWC set a quota of 850 sperm whales to be taken over two years. Id. at 24.
The quota expired after the 1983-84 season. This left the previous zero quota in effect because the
Scientific Committee was once again unable to recommend a quota in 1984. INTERNIONAL WHALING
COMM'N, 35TH REPoRT 70 (1985). The Commission did notseta catch limit forthe 1984-85season. The
zero quota, therefore, remained effective. Id. at 30, table 3 n.1 (1985).
30. Japan objected to the zero quota after the 1981 meeting. INTmNATiONAL WHALING COMM'N,
33D REPoRT 9, table 3 n.1 (1983). See also Whaling Convention, supra note 10, art. V, para. 3, 62 Stat.
at 1719, T.I.A.S. No. 1849 at 5, 161 U.N.T.S. at 80, 82. The objection is stillin effect. INTRNATnONAL
WHALING COMM'N, 35TH REPoRT 70 table 3 n.* (1984).
31. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1415 (D.D.C.) (citing
plaintiffs' reply memorandum), aff'd on other grounds, 768 E2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted
sub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955).
32. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
Enacting the complete commercial whaling moratorium was aprimary goal of United States whaling
policy. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. The indefinite commercial moratorium was passed in
1982 by the IWC, and was scheduled to take effect beginningin the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic
seasons. In 1990 the IWC will assess whether the moratorium should be modified and catch limits
reestablished. INTERNATiONAL WHALING COMM'N, 33D REPoRT 21 (1983). Achieving full compliance
with the moratorium is currently the primary goal of United States whaling policy. The moratorium
includes the cessation of sperm whaling.
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force the Secretaries of Commerce and State to certify the Japanese and
impose sanctions. 33 The district court granted the plaintiffs' prayer for
injunction, holding that the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments
mandate certification of any whaling in excess of IWC quotas.34
The decision was affirmed on appeal. 35 In American Cetacean Society v.
Baldrige, the court of appeals held that the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments impose on the Secretary of Commerce a nondiscretionary
duty to certify when he determines that the nationals of a state are harvest-
ing whales in excess of an IWC quota.36 The court principally interpreted
the Pelly Amendment certification provision, since the Packwood-Magnu-
son Amendment borrowed without modification the Pelly certification
provision. 37 The court looked to the language and legislative history of the
Pelly Amendment and prior related legislation to determine congressional
intent regarding the meaning of the controlling phrase, "to diminish the
effectiveness" of an international conservation program. 38 The court then
examined legislative history subsequent to the passage of the Pelly amend-
ment to discover whether Congress expressed a different intent in the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. 39
In its examination of the legislative history of the Pelly Amendment, the
court discerned a clear and unequivocal congressional intent that violation
of an IWC whaling quota constituted a per se action diminishing the
effectiveness of an international program and hence required automatic
certification.4 0 In addition, the court noted that a 1962 amendment to the
33. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (D.D.C.), aff'don other
grounds, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955). Senator Packwood, sponsor of the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, also criticized the negotiations and claimed that certification in the
sperm whale case is mandatory, not discretionary. He asserted that the amendment left no "wiggle
room or gray area" for the Secretary of Commerce to avoid certification by negotiating with the
Japanese. Press release from Senator Packwood: Packwood-Magnuson Not Discretionary Policy
(November 2, 1984) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). However, his statements cannot be
used to discern congressional intent at the time the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment was passed. See,
e.g., Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974) ("Such statements
Irepresent only the personal views of these legislators, since the statements were made after passage of
the Act. "') (brackets omitted) (quoting National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S.
612, 639 n.34 (1967)).
34. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. at 1411. In a subsequent action, the
court also rejected the government's plea for a stay of execution of the writ of mandamus pending an
appeal. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1411, 1417 (D.D.C. 1985).
35. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426,445 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub
nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955).
36. American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 444.
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
38. American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 435-39.
39. Id. at 439-43.
40. Id. at 437.
638
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Tuna Convention Act of 195041 (the "Tuna Act") also used the phrase, "to
diminish the effectiveness," in a context similar to the Pelly Amendment. 42
This similarity made the legislative history of the Tuna Act relevant to the
determination of congressional intent behind the Pelly Amendment. 43 The
court found statements in the Tuna Act's legislative history indicating that
if a foreign state failed to implement the harvest recommendations of the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, "that failure would automat-
ically result [in the] imposition of the statutory sanctions on the foreign
country."44 The court's review of the Tuna Act confirmed its conclusion
that when Congress enacted the Pelly Amendment, Congress intended that
violating an internationally set quota would per se "diminish the effective-
ness" of the international fishery conservation program.45
The court then turned to legislative history of acts subsequent to the Pelly
Amendment, including the 1978 "wildlife amendments" to the Pelly
Amendment and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. The court con-
cluded that Congress expressed no intent to change the meaning of the
phrase "diminish the effectiveness" contained in the original Pelly Amend-
ment in the context at issue in the case.46 Thus the court concluded that
Congress intended any act by a country that allowed its nationals to fish in
excess of internationally set quotas to be an act which per se diminished the
effectiveness of the program. The court held that in such a case the Pelly
Amendment automatically requires the Secretary of Commerce to certify
that state.47
III. ANALYSIS-THE DECISION TO CERTIFY NATIONS THAT
OBJECT TO AND EXCEED IWC QUOTAS IS
DISCRETIONARY
The American Cetacean court misinterpreted the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments. It did not adequately examine the legislative
history of the amendments. Congress did not mandate certification of every
international conservation quota violation, regardless of its consequences;
instead, the decision to certify is discretionary in all cases where the
violation does not endanger the managed whale population. The American
Cetacean court failed to consider, first, whether the Japanese whaling
41. Id. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 951-61 (1982).
42. American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 438.
43. Id. at 437-38.
44. Id. at 438.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 443.
47. Id. at 444.
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activities posed sufficient risk of endangering the sperm whale population
to render the Secretary's decision automatic; and second, if the decision
was not automatic, whether the Secretary abused his discretion in deter-
mining that the Japanese whaling activities should not be certified.
The court also ignored past agency practice and Congressional accep-
tance of that practice. Congress has been periodically informed that the
Secretary of Commerce has consistently interpreted and applied the Pelly
and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments in a way that demonstrates that
exceeding an IWC quota does not automatically require certification.
A. Congress Did Not Mandate Certification in All Cases of Quota
Violations
The Pelly and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendments do not require the
Secretary of Commerce to automatically certify a country for objecting to
and exceeding an IWC quota where the excess whaling is minor. While
contrary statements exist in the legislative record, 48 the legislative history
of the amendments as a whole demonstrates that Congress expected the
Secretary to exercise discretion in the certification decision. The discretion
resides in the Secretary's evaluation of whether effectiveness has been
diminished. However, the Secretary must certify after finding that a coun-
try has been "diminishing the effectiveness" of the Whaling Convention. 49
Certification under the amendments results from acts found by the
Secretary of Commerce to "diminish the effectiveness" of the Conven-
tion. 50 However, the phrase, "to diminish the effectiveness," is not defined
in either of the amendments and does not on its face indicate that objecting
to and exceeding a quota necessarily is such a diminishment. 51 The
48. See infra note 77.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i) (1982); see also 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1982).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A) (1982). Certification under the Pelly Amendment results from acts
that diminish the effectiveness of an international fisheries conservation program, 22 U.S.C.
§ 1978(a)(1) (1982), which includes the Whaling Convention.
51. If Congress had intended for the Secretary of Commerce to have no discretion in the certifica-
tion decision, Congress could have stated so clearly and unambiguously. For example, see infra note 73.
Instead Congress chose not to do so.
Objecting to and then exceeding a quota does not necessarily diminish the effectiveness of the
Whaling Convention. The effectiveness of the Convention rests, in great measure, on membership by a
wide variety of nations. It must be remembered that each IWC member has the right to object to a quota
or resolution. A member strongly opposing a quota can mitigate its effect on the member nation by
objecting; otherwise the member's only alternative to accepting the quota would be to resign from the
IWC. See Scarff, supra note 18, at 357. It is preferable for a member to object to a quota rather than
resign because, as a member nation, negotiation and ultimate agreement to abide by the quota is more
likely. Therefore objecting to and exceeding a quota does not necessarily "diminish the effectiveness"
of the Convention.
In addition, the statutory framework of the Convention presumes the eventuality of objections on
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legislative history of the two amendments, however, does give meaning to
the phrase.52 A careful reading of that legislative history shows that the
Japanese should not be certified in the current case.
1. Legislative History of the Pelly Amendment
Contrary to the American Cetacean court's conclusion, the legislative
history of the Pelly Amendment is not clear on whether the amendment
requires certification of all quota violations. The American Cetacean court
failed to consider the legislative history as a whole. A thorough examina-
tion points instead to the conclusion that Congress directed the Secretary of
Commerce to certify a country that objects to and exceeds a fisheries
conservation quota when its excess whaling endangers the managed spe-
cies. Congress did not intend the amendment to cover minor or harmless
violations of a conservation program.
Given the ambiguity of the legislative history, the court should have
looked first to the primary concern addressed by the Pelly Amendment: the
possible extinction of the Atlantic salmon resulting from overfishing in
disregard of established salmon quotas. 53 Congressman Pelly introduced
the amendment to avert a "severe conservation crisis [threatening] the
Atlantic salmon." 54 The discussion of the Pelly Amendment on the floor of
the House by Congressman Pelly and other supporters of the amendment
demonstrates that the amendment addressed conservation crises where the
occasion. Nevertheless, relevant quotas remain applicable to nonobjecting members. Thus, despite the
objections and excess catches by certain members, the overall objective of reducing the total interna-
tional catch can be achieved.
52. When the language of a statute is ambiguous or unclear the court may look to legislative history
for clarification. See, e.g., United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303 (1969). This rule of
statutory construction was used by the appellate court in American Cetacean. 768 F.2d at 436.
53. Extinction threatened the Atlantic salmon even though their exploitation was regulated by the
International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, February 8, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 477,
T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S. 157. Although salmon are migratory fish, Danish fishermen had
discovered where the schools congregated in the ocean and commenced to overfish them severely.
International appreciation of the seriousness of this practice led to a total ban on the ocean fishing of the
salmon through the International NorthwestAtlantic Fishing Commission. See 117 CONG. R.c 34,751
(1971) (statement of Rep. Dingell). But the charter of the Commission allowed members to exempt
themselves from any quota by means of a timely objection. International Convention for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries, February 8, 1949, art. VIII, para. 9, 1 U.S.T. 477, 483,T.I.A.S. No. 2089 at 8, 157
U.N.T.S. 157, 170. Denmark filed an objection and became exempt from the ban. See 117 CONG. REc.
34,751 (1971) (statement of Rep. Dingell). The Danes' continued overfishing of the Atlantic salmon led
to the introduction of the Pelly Amendment. See infra note 54.
Congress also desired that the Pelly Amendment protect endangered whale species. Congress hoped
that the Pelly Amendment would be useful in "prevent[ing] the extinction of the world's whale
population." 117 CONG. Rac. 34,754 (1971) (statement of Rep. Hogan).
54. 117 CoNG. Rac. 34,751 (1971) (statement of Rep. Pelly). See also H.R. REP. No. 468, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 2409, 2410.
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fishing activities of a nation threatened the extinction of a regulated
international fishery. Representative Pelly stated: "I was prompted to
introduce this legislation because of the severe conservation crisis which
has arisen with respect to Atlantic salmon." 55 He continued:
[T]he Atlantic salmon will disappear ....
The saga of the Atlantic salmon is unfortunately being repeated around the
world with respect to many other creatures that inhabit the seas, most notably
the whale. Commercial pressure has virtually wiped out the largest and most
awesome species of whale ...
. . . [T]he whaling issue and the impending over-exploitation of other
living marine resources prompted me to suggest to the committee [on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries] that this legislation be expanded to give the
President the authority to embargo fishery products in the case of flagrant
violation of any international fishery conservation program. 56
Finally: "[Tihis legislation represents a clear directive from the Congress
to the President that the United States will not permit foreign countries
which flount [sic] international conservation measures to profit through
continued access to the American marketplace." '57 During the brief
55. 117 CONG. REc. 34,751 (1971).
56. Id. at 34,752 (statement of Rep. Pelly) (emphasis added).
57. Id. (statement of Rep. Pelly).
Other members of Congress expressed similar concerns and objectives:
Statement of Representative Wylie:
[O]verfishing in this area [by Danish fishermen] has threatened the extinction of this natural
resource . ..
This bill before us would help correct this state of affairs by banning fish imports. . . from
nations which endanger American stocks offish by overfishing. The bill calls on the Secretary of
Commerce to inform the Secretary of the Treasury when American stocks of fish are endangered
by overfishing by foreign fishermen.
Id. (emphasis added).
Statement of Representative Conte: "There is an urgent need to protect stocks of Atlantic salmon from
wasteful high seas fishery." Id. at 34,753.
Statement of Representative Hicks: "In recent years, extensive fishing by foreign vessels in U.S. coastal
waters has caused serious depletion in fish stocks." Id.
Statement of Representative Clausen:
[W]e must take every feasible step to insure that [salmon] are not brought to the brink of extinction
by fishermen using calculated plundering for short-term gain.
The North Atlantic salmon is the prime example of a species being ravished thoughtlessly and
without regard for appropriate conservation measures. The annual harvest must be controlled so as
to insure the continued viability of this great fish. Our approval of [the Pelly Amendment] is the
most realistic and effective means to achieve this goal.
Id. at 34,753-54.
Statement of Representative Hogan:
I joined in cosponsoring [a bill similar in scope to the Pelly Amendment] whose purpose is to
protect the existence of the Atlantic salmon. ...
Because this legislation includes marine mammals as well as fish, it may be of some importance
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discussion on the Pelly Amendment in the Senate, Senator Stevens also
identified protection of the Atlantic salmon from extinction as the main
purpose of the amendment. 58 The committee report on the amendment
presents a similar purpose. 59
Because Congress directed the Pelly Amendment to cases where exceed-
ing quotas endangered the existence of a fish or whale stock, Congress
intended that such cases be certified as "diminishing the effectiveness" of.
an international conservation program. However, not all quotas are set at
the maximum exploitation level beyond which the managed species will be
endangered. 60 A violation of a quota may be minor and inconsequential.
There is no indication that Congress required or desired that minor viola-
tions be certified. The Pelly Amendment did not address minor violations.
Thus, where a country exceeds a quota, the amendment allows the Secre-
tary of Commerce to consider the consequences of the country's action.
Where exceeding a quota does not endanger a species, the Pelly Amend-
ment does not require certification.
The American Cetacean court ignored the express focus of the Pelly
Amendment on the protection of endangered species in its review of the
amendment's legislative history. Instead, the court attempted to demon-
strate that Congress mandated that virtually any violation of an interna-
tionally set fishing quota must be certified. First, the court quoted from a
Senate Report that the Secretary of Commerce must certify fishing opera-
tions that are inconsistent with international conservation programs. 61
Then the court equated "international conservationprograms" with "inter-
nationally set quotas."62 The court concluded that the quoted statement
from the Senate Report plus similar statements from other legislative
sources "mak[e] abundantly clear that exceeding internationally set quotas
was intended to automatically trigger certification. ",63
in our continuing efforts to prevent the extinction of the world's whale population.
Id. at 34,754.
58. 117 CONG. REc. 47,054 (1971).
59. H.R. REP. No. 468, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6, reprintedin 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWs
2410-12.
60. A quota may be established by using factors other than whale conservation goals and the
interests of the whaling industry. The current sperm whale quota, for example, resulted from political
concerns rather than scientific judgment. See infra note 115.
61. American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 436.
62. Id.
63. Id.
Throughout the section on the Pelly Amendment, the court used phrases such as: "indicate quite
plainly," "abundantly clear," "unambiguous passage," "obviously contemplate," and "clearly indi-
cates." American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 436-37. This language does not strengthen the court's
construction of the amendment.
643
Washington Law Review
The court's conclusion is in fact not so clear. The term "internationally
set programs" is not equivalent to the term "internationally set quotas." A
quota is not a conservation program. A country's fishing operations may
exceed a fishing quota, which may have been set far below the level beyond
which the fishery would be endangered, by a de minimus amount and yet
still support the international conservation program's goal of responsible
fisheries management. In such a case, violation of a "quota" is not
equivalent to violation of an entire "program. "64 In contrast, where a quota
has been set to preserve a depleted fishery, and where a state's fishing
operations endanger the fishery by egregiously exceeding the quota, viola-
tion of the quota is arguably equivalent to violation of the conservation
program that gave rise to the quota. However, by equating "quotas" with
"programs," the court rendered even the smallest and most inconsequen-
tial violation of a quota automatically certifiable. In doing so, the court
entirely failed to account for Congress' express targeting of the Pelly
Amendment to the protection of endangered species. 65
Equating "programs" with "quotas" is particularly inappropriate in the
sperm whale case because of the unusual, unscientific, and political man-
ner in which the sperm whale zero quota was set. 66 Given the political
nature of the quota and its lack of support from the Scientific Committee, 67
violating the quota by a small and harmless amount can hardly be equated
with harming the Whaling Convention and its goal of responsible whale
management.
The court noted but dismissed as irrelevant Representative Pelly's state-
ment that the amendment should extend to cover "the case of flagrant
violation" of any international fisheries conservation program. 68 When
read in conjunction with the numerous statements in Congress of urgency
over the need to avert the depletion of whales and other living marine
resources,69 Pelly's statement is relevant as evidence that Congress was
little concerned with minor and inconsequential violations of quotas.
64. The court did not address the language of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, which
expressly conditions certification upon an act diminishing the effectiveness of the Whaling Convention,
16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A) (1982), rather than a quota or regulation of the Convention. In this case it is
even less "abundantly clear" that exceeding an IWC quota is equivalent to diminishing the effective-
ness of the Convention, and hence "automatically triggers certification."
65. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 437 n. 13.
69. See supra note 57.
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The court stated that no congressional speaker "ever remotely sug-
gested" that there is some exercise of discretion in the certification deci-
sion.70 The suggestion of discretion is in fact implicit throughout the
legislative history in Congress' concern with preventing the extinction of
the Atlantic salmon, whales, and other living marine resources. Where a
violation is minor and inconsequential, there is no indication that Congress
intended, or even desired, certification. 71
The court also inappropriately found support for its position in a state-
ment by the Executive Branch. To show that the Executive Branch itself
understood that certification was nondiscretionary in the event of a quota
violation, the opinion quoted a Commerce Department statement that,
under the Pelly Amendment, the President would be authorized to impose
sanctions on countries that ignore the ban on high seas fishing for Atlantic
salmon.72 Once again, the court failed to distinguish the significance of a
salmon ban violation, which would endanger the species, from the minor
and inconsequential violation of a politically-set whale quota. The state-
ment does not support the court's holding that the Pelly Amendment
required certification of inconsequential violations.
A thorough overview of the legislative history of the Pelly Amendment
indicates that Congress intended to protect endangered fisheries and ma-
rine mammals from overexploitation by fishing operations in disregard of
international conservation programs. There is no indication that Congress
intended the amendment to require certification of minor, inconsequential
violations of fishing or whaling quotas. The Secretary of Commerce may
exercise discretion in deciding whether a violation of a quota should be
certified under the Pelly Amendment. Where the managed species is not
endangered by harvesting in excess of a quota, the Secretary may decide
against certification.
The American Cetacean court failed to consider the purpose behind the
Pelly Amendment in its holding that the amendment mandates automatic
certification of quota violations. The court ignored the circumstances
surrounding the introduction and passage of the Amendment, and failed to
distinguish between serious and inconsequential violations of quotas.
70. American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 437.
71. A number of express references by members of Congress to the exercise of discretion in the
certification decision appear during consideration of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. See infra
notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
72. American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 E2d at 437.
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Instead the court equated conservation "programs" with "quotas," and
made inappropriate use of statements from the legislative history.73
73. The court also cited the Tuna Convention Act of 1950 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 951-61 (1982)) and its legislative history to confirm its conclusion that exceeding internationally set
fishing or whaling quotas would per se diminish the effectiveness of the international fishery con-
servation program. American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 437-38. The court quoted a general principle
of statutory construction: "[A]bsent evidence to the contrary, words or phrases taken from prior
legislation will be given the same meaning, since there is hardly a basis for assuming that the lawmakers
had anything else in mind." Id. at 437 (quoting United Shoe Workers of America v. Bedell, 506 F.2d
174, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
The court found this rule of construction important because the key phrase in the Pelly Amendment
("to diminish the effectiveness") was previously used by Congress in the Tuna Act in a similar
situation. The court noted that Congress spelled out its intended meaning of the phrase, "diminishing
the effectiveness" of the conservation recommendations of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion. The phrase was to include those occasions when a "country does not put into effect conservation
measures applicable to its own fishermen adequate for the implementation of the [Tuna] Commission's
[harvest] recommendations." Id. at 438 (statement of Secretary of the Interior, reprinted in S. REP. No.
1737, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962)). The failure to implement tuna harvest recommendations would
automatically result in the imposition of the statutory sanctions on the foreign country. Id. The court
concluded that, given the similarities between the Tuna Act and the Pelly Amendment, the "clear
congressional intent with respect to the tuna amendments" indicated that Congress similarly intended
for exceeding fishing or whaling quotas to constitute a diminishment of the effectiveness of an
international fishery conservation program and to automatically trigger certification. Id.
The court failed to consider the phrase in question as a whole. There is a crucial difference between
the similar phrases of the Tuna Act and the Pelly Amendment. The language of the Tuna Act is more
precise and specific than that of the Pelly Amendment. The Tuna Act requires the Secretary of
Commerce to act when there is conduct which "diminish[es] the effectiveness of the conservation
recommendations of the commission .. " 16 U.S.C. § 955(c) (1982) (emphasis added). The Pelly
Amendment, on the other hand, requires the Secretary to certify after the Secretary determines that
foreign nationals are fishing in a manner which "diminish[es] the effectiveness of an international
fishery conservationprogram .. "22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). It is clear from
the express language of the Tuna Act that Congress intended that the Secretary of Commerce sanction a
violation of the Tuna Commission's recommendations. It is not clear from the language of the Pelly
Amendment that Congress intended the Secretary of Commerce to sanction every violation of a quota of
an international fishery conservation program. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The differ-
ence in the language of the Pelly Amendment and the Tuna Act suggests that Congress may have
intended a different interpretation for the diminishment language for each legislation, thus invalidating
the American Cetacean court's construction of the Pelly Amendment by Congress' intent in the Tuna
Act.
Congress demonstrated in the Tuna Act as amended that, when it means to, it can expressly stipulate
the sanctioning of specific acts. Congress chose not to do so, however, in the Pelly Amendment, nor in
the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. Instead, Congress chose to word the amendments broadly and
did not designate per se violations in the legislative histories. The vagueness of the two amendments,
when contrasted with the precise language and legislative history of the Tuna Act, supports the
conclusion that Congress left to the Secretary of Commerce the discretion to determine when an act
diminishes the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program.
The court also ignored key elements of the quoted statutory construction rule from United Shoe
Workers. Prior legislation is to be consulted only "absent evidence to the contrary" since then "there is
hardly a basis for assuming that the lawmakers had anything else in mind." United Shoe Workers, 506
F.2d 174, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There is extensive evidence that, unlike Congress' apparent intention in
the Tuna Act, Congress intended for the diminishment language in the Pelly Amendment to impart
discretion to the Secretary of Commerce in the certification decision. See supra notes 48-72 and
accompanying text. Thus, since contrary evidence and ample basis for believing Congress had
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In the current case, where Japan's sperm whaling during the 1984-85
season did not endanger the stock,74 the Secretary of Commerce properly
exercised discretion and independent judgment in his decision against
certification of Japan.
2. Legislative History of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
The American Cetacean court agreed that the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment linked mandatory sanctions to the Pelly certification process
for whaling activities. 75 Therefore, the administrative discretion inherent in
Pelly Amendment certifications, 76 contrary to the court's conclusion, ren-
ders Packwood-Magnuson certifications discretionary as well.
As with the Pelly Amendment, the legislative history of the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment provides additional evidence that certification is
discretionary.77 Supporters of the amendment in both chambers, including
"something else in mind" existed, the court's reliance on the Tuna Act language was misplaced.
Furthermore, the court failed to consider a related principle of statutory interpretation expressed in
the same opinion. The United Shoe Workers court continued:
But the assertion of a general principle of statutory interpretation [that identical phrases in
different legislation should be given the same meaning] is not by itself enough; we cannot properly
construe even related pieces of legislation without due regard to the purposes they respectively
serve. We must fully explore the allegedly analogous statute and compare it, in light of the factual
situation at hand, with the language and objective of the statute under investigation.
506 F.2d at 188 (footnotes omitted). The American Cetacean court failed to explore fully the Tuna Act
and compare it and its purpose with the language and objective of the Pelly Amendment. The court also
totally ignored the "factual situation at hand" in its discussion of the relevance of the Tuna Act to the
Pelly Amendment. Lacking an adequate and complete comparison of the Tuna Act with the Pelly
Amendment, the American Cetacean court's premise for finding confirmation of its conclusion in the
similar language of the Tuna Act fails.
The court's analysis in this section is faulty for other reasons. The court observed that attachments to
the House Report on the Pelly Amendment, H.R. REP. No. 468, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1971
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2409, contained comments from various executive agencies. The court
quoted a letter from the Secretary of Commerce included therein stating that the scheme involved in the
Tuna Act is "similar in language and approach" to that of the Pelly Amendment. American Cetacean
Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 437. This statement by the Secretary of Commerce, in reference to the overall scheme
of the amendments, does not support the court's argument that the Pelly Amendment diminishment
language must be interpreted in light of the nondiscretionary element of the Tuna Act. It may be true that
the broad schemes of the different amendments are similar. The statement cannot properly be
interpreted, however, to mean that the similarity necessarily extends to fine points such as the similar
diminishment language.
74. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
75. American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 434-35.
76. See supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
77. The Packwood-Magnuson legislative history does, however, contain some statements to the
contrary. See, e.g., Hearing on Whaling Operations Conducted Outside the Control of the IWC Before
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1979) (statement of
Sen. Packwood) ("[The Packwood Amendment] says that you cannot fish in the 200-mile zone if you
violate the IWC regulations .... ") [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing on Outlaw Whaling].
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Senator Packwood, the bill's principal sponsor, asserted in strong language
that the amendment's purpose was to stop illegal and irresponsible whaling
practices that were endangering whale populations. 78 Others recognized
the significance and relevance of the circumstances of each case in the
certification decision. 79 The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, similar to
the Pelly Amendment, addressed serious violations that endangered whale
species, rather than minor and inconsequential violations. Hence certifica-
tion under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, just as under Pelly, need
not be automatic if the whaling exceeds an IWC quota by a small number
78. 125 CONG. REC. 21,742 (1979) (statement of Sen. Packwood); id. at 21,743-44 (statement of
Sen. Cannon); id. at 22,083 (statement of Rep. Oberstar).
That minor and harmless violations were not the focus of the legislation can be demonstrated in
another way. If the flagrancy of a violation were immaterial to whether the act "diminished the
effectiveness" of the Whaling Convention, certification should follow the technical act of filing an
objection to a quota, and other inconsequential acts. Evidence shows that, however, without more, these
types of acts are not certifiable. See Hearing on U.S. Whaling Policy Oversight Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1983) (statement of Dr. John Byrne, Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminstration, United States Department of Commerce) (an objection is
insufficient to trigger certification under either amendment) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearing on
U.S. Whaling Policy]. Accord Whaling Policy and IWC Oversight Hearing, supra note 24, at 312
(statement of Richard Frank, Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
United States Department of Commerce; United States Commissioner to the IWC) (the Pelly Amend-
ment applies to a country that has significantly violated a quota).
79. Representative Breaux, Chairperson of the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Con-
servation and the Environment, the House committee charged with consideration of Packwood-
Magnuson, described discretion, or "flexibility," as part of the certification process. FCMA Oversight
Hearings, supra note 24, at 314 ("[11n certifying that a country is in violation of some international
agreement, . . . there is a lot of flexibility in that certification .... "); Whaling Policy and IWC
Oversight Hearing, supra note 24, at 359 ([T]here is still somewhat a degree of discretion within the
certification process as to whether a country is in violation of the terms of the international agreement
and that is always going to be there .... "). Representative Breaux also stated that the Secretary of
Commerce should be careful to examine "all the facts surrounding a possible certification . 125
CONG. REc. 22,083 (1979).
These statements, however, appear to conflict with another statement by Representative Breaux:
"The [Packwood-Magnuson] [A]mendment would require the Secretary of Commerce to deny fishing
permits to nationals of those foreign nations which were found to be in contravention of an international
conservation agreement. ... FCMA Oversight Hearings, supra note 24, at 312. This apparent
inconsistency was used by the American Cetacean court as reason to dismiss all of Representative
Breaux's statements. 768 F.2d at 442 n.20. However, the court's dismissal of Representative Breaux's
statements is inappropriate. The comment that appeared to describe the amendment as nondiscretionary
was a general introductory statement, a one-sentence description of the amendment for the benefit of the
rest of the committee and audience. More importantly, the mandatory language of his comment ("the
amendment would require the Secretary") applied to the imposition of sanctions after certification,
rather than to the certification decision itself. The language pertaining to the actual certification ("found
to be in contravention of an international conservation agreement") does not necessarily suggest that the
speaker believed that certification was nondiscretionary. On the other hand, Representative Breaux's
descriptions of the certification decision as discretionary are clear, precise, and unambiguous.
Ambassador John Negroponte, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs,
Department of State, also agreed that certification was discretionary. FCMA Oversight Hearings, supra
note 24, at 317.
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and does not endanger a whale stock. The Secretary of Commerce must
consider and balance a number of factors, not just the disregard of a quota.
In its discussion of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, the American
Cetacean court relied on statements by Senator Packwood and others to
support its conclusion that Congress intended whaling in excess of IWC
quotas to trigger certification automatically. 80 The statements in fact pro-
vide no such support. In the statements of Senator Packwood quoted by the
court, the Senator persistently referred to the effectiveness of his amend-
ment in attacking illegal whaling. However, illegal whaling is distinguish-
able from whaling that exceeds an IWC quota but is exempt from the quota
and thus is consistent with the provisions of the Whaling Convention. Since
the Convention allows a member nation to exempt itself from a regula-
tion,81 a member, such as Japan, that minimally exceeds a quota after
properly exempting itself is not conducting illegal whaling activities.
Hence, the Senator's statements on illegal whaling do not support the
court's conclusion concerning automatic certification of exempted whaling
in excess of IWC quotas. This interpretation provides the court with only
ambiguous statements by the Senator, since it is not clear whether "illegal
whaling" refers to Convention violations or to exceeding a quota in the
fashion provided in the Convention. A more narrow interpretation suggests
that the statements refer to illegal whaling not at issue in the Japanese
sperm whaling case.
The court used statements of three other congressmen in support of its
conclusion of automatic certification. The court quoted Senator Magnuson
as stating that: "If a foreign country is certified by the Secretary of
Commerce for violating or diminishing the effectiveness of international
whaling regulations . then that nation will be denied access to fish in
our 200-mile fishery conservation zone."' 82 This statement provides no
additional insight into whether minor excess whaling by a country that has
properly exempted itself from a quota is automatically certifiable.
The court also quoted Representative Murphy, who noted that "with
respect to any nation which the Secretary of Commerce has certified as
being in violation of the IWC, the Secretary of State is required to
immediately [impose sanctions]. '' 83 This statement is irrelevant to the
question of when certification is required.
Finally, the court quoted Representative Oberstar, a committee member
active in passage of the Amendment, who stated that "[t]he Department of
Commerce certifies a nation under the provisions of [the Pelly] amendment
80. See American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 440-41.
81. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
82. American Cetacean Socy, 768 F.2d at 441 (emphasis added).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
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when a nation is found to have acted in a manner contrary to international
agreements for the protection of a fisheries resource. ", 84 Since the Whaling
Convention expressly allows member nations to exempt themselves from
quotas and regulations, 85 objecting to and then exceeding a quota by a
small amount is not necessarily acting in a manner "contrary to interna-
tional agreements."
B. Policy Implications of Japanese Certification
Since the court found that the amendments require the Secretary to
certify Japan, the court did not go on to consider the reasonableness of the
Secretary's decision before it ordered the Secretary of Commerce to certify
Japan. After reviewing the circumstances in this case, the court should have
approved the Secretary's exercise of discretion as neither arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or manifestly contrary to law.86
A key consideration in the Secretary's decision against certification was
the effect of certification on United States-Japanese trade relations. Con-
gressman Pelly acknowledged to Congress that his amendment would
affect foreign relations and that it would be "unwise to tie the hands of the
executive" with his amendment. 87 Accordingly, the Secretary considered a
number of factors concerning foreign relations in his decision against
certification, including the potential damage to United States-Japanese
relations from certification. 88 In the arena of foreign relations, the Ex-
ecutive has greater access to information and a superior grasp of policy and
political considerations than do Congress or the courts. 89 The Executive
also has constitutional predominance in the field of foreign affairs. 90 Yet the
amendments as construed by the American Cetacean court unduly restrict
84. Id.
85. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
86. This is the standard of review for discretionary agency decisions. American Cetacean Soc'y,
768 F.2d at 433.
87. 117 CONG. REC. at 34,752 (1971).
88. Concern over the effect of certification on relations between the two countries was a catalyst for
the executive agreement. Japan's counterpart to Secretary Baldrige in the negotiations on the agreement
wrote in a letter to Secretary Baldrige: "As you know, the Government of Japan is keenly aware that the
whaling issue poses a threat of friction between our two countries. The Government of Japan wishes to
resolve this issue as quickly and amicably as possible to avoid a confrontation .... " Letter from
Charge d'Affaires Murazumi to Secretary Baldrige (November 13, 1984) (confirming the whaling
agreement) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
89. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSrrrON 37-39 (1972). The question of
whether this case presents an unjusticiable political question is beyond the scope of this article. For a
general discussion of the political question doctrine, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 3-16, at 71-79 (1978). For the application of the political question doctrine to foreign affairs, see
Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). See also American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 447-48
(Oberdorfer, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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the Executive's foreign policy judgment. Japan is one of America's major
trading partners and an important ally.91 If Japan is certified, the automatic
Packwood-Magnuson sanctions may impair trade relations at a time when
these relations are under increasing strain. 92 In light of the amendments'
close relationship with foreign affairs and the state of United States-
Japanese trade relations at this time, had the court reached this question, it
should have deferred to the Secretary's decision not to certify. 93
A second factor in the certification decision is that Japan might retaliate
against the United States fishing industry, which could significantly harm
domestic fishing interests.94 The Secretary of Commerce has the expertise
to assign this factor the appropriate weight in the certification decision.
A third consideration in the Secretary's decision is the effect that
certifying Japan will have on the amendments' ability to influence Japan's
decision to honor the future commercial whaling moratorium. Achieving
full compliance with the moratorium is a primary goal of United States
whaling policies.95 Japan has agreed to the moratorium in exchange for the
United States promise not to certify Japan for its current low level of sperm
whaling. 96 Japan will withdraw its acceptance if the American Cetacean
Society decision is affirmed on appeal. 97 In that case the Pelly and Pack-
wood-Magnuson Amendments' sanctions will have to be used to force
91. See Staff Editorial, Tora, Tora, Tariff, Wail St. J., Apr. 12, 1985, at24, col. 1.
92. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1985, at A7, col. 2.
93. It is true that automatic sanctions after certification of a country for endangering whale
populations would also impair foreign relations and "tie the hands of the executive." In this case,
Congress weighed the effect on foreign relations against the threat to whales and gave greater weight to
the protection of whales by providing for automatic sanctions. However, where whale populations are
not endangered by whaling practices, as in the current case, Congress intended the executive to balance
the relevant factors, including the effect on foreign relations, in the certification decision. See supra
notes 53-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant legislative history.
94. The Japanese would probably retaliate against sanctions by refusing to buy fish from Ameri-
cans. The financial impact on the northwestern United States fishing industry would be disastrous. See
Seattle Times, Nov. 11, 1984, at A34.
In addition, the impact of the sanctions on Japan will be less than the impact of Japanese retaliation on
domestic fishing interests. Currently, Japan is the largest buyer of United States fish products, annually
importing approximately $620 million of processed fishery products from the United States. Japan has
also established numerous joint ventures in the United States with American fishermen and buys about
$9.5 million of fish directly from domestic harvesters. Many of these operations would be at risk. On
the other hand, Japan catches only about $296 million in fish from United States waters and exports
$310 million of fish products to the United States. Oversight Hearing on U.S. Whaling Policy, supra
note 78, at 297 (memorandum from subcommittee Chairperson Breaux to subcommittee members).
95. Hearing on Review of the 34th IWC Meeting Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and
International Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982)
(staff report on the IWC meeting) [hereinafter cited as Review of the 34th IWC]; Oversight Hearing on
U.S. Whaling Policy, supra note 78, at 246. See supra note 32 for a discussion of the commercial
moratorium and its significance.
96. Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
97. Id.
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Japan to accept the moratorium in addition to the sperm whale zero quota.
In terms of international relations, Japan's acceptance of the moratorium
under the gentler pressure of negotiation and the threat of certification is
preferable to acceptance due to actual economic injury.
In addition, imposing sanctions now will reduce the weight and impact
of possible sanctions available later against Japan. The full force of the
amendments should be reserved for use against Japan if it violates the
commercial moratorium. 98 Certifying the current, relatively insignificant
violation will limit the effectiveness of the sanctions in the future.99 If
Japan's allowable catch is reduced 50 to 100 percent upon certification
under Packwood-Magnuson,100 further reductions for violations of the
moratorium will have comparatively less impact since they will reduce only
the remaining allowable catch, rather than the full initial allowable catch.
After enduring the initial sanctions, Japan may decide to disregard the
moratorium after deciding that the benefits of doing so may exceed the
costs of additional sanctions. The Secretary has more experience and
expertise than the courts to balance the benefits of current certification
against the negative effects of current certification on the amendments'
future effectiveness against Japan.
These factors illustrate the nature of the policy considerations of the
certification decision. Because the Secretary of Commerce is better suited
than a court for this type of decision, the Secretary's decision to withhold
certification pending Japan's performance of the terms of the November
agreement, including acceptance of the commercial moratorium, should
not be overturned by the court.
C. Agency Interpretation of the Amendments
In refusing to certify Japan in the current sperm whaling controversy, the
Secretary of Commerce has interpreted the amendments consistently with
past agency practice.101 Therefore the plaintiffs in American Cetacean
98. See supra note 32 for a discussion of the commercial moratorium and its significance.
99. Review of the 34th IWC, supra note 95, at 33-34.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B) (1982).
101. Reviewing courts should give substantial deference to the interpretation of a statute by the
agency responsible for its administration unless there are compelling reasons to believe that the
interpretation is wrong. E.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977). This
deference is particularly appropriate where the administration has construed the statute consistently
over a period of time. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981); see also Federal Election Comnm'n v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981). Deference is also appropriate when
Congress has acquiesced in an agency's construction of a statute. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969); see also Kay v. FCC, 443 F.2d 638, 646, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
In the current controversy the reviewing court should defer to the Secretary of Commerce's
interpretation of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments because there are no compelling
reasons to believe it is wrong, see notes 48-100 and accompanying text (sections III A & B), and
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cannot complain that the Secretary of Commerce acted arbitrarily in
deciding against certification. In addition, past practice is relevant to the
current case because, contrary to the court's finding in American Cetacean,
Congress has been informed of the Secretary's interpretation. 10 2
1. Interpretation of the Pelly Amendment: The Minke Whale Case
The application of the Pelly Amendment by the Department of Com-
merce before 1979 shows that Japan's disregard of the sperm whale quota
need not "diminish the effectiveness"" of the Whaling Convention. Whal-
ing nations have been certified under Pelly on several occasions and for
various reasons. The 1974 certifications of Japan and the Soviet Union for
minke whaling are enlightening because of the apparent similarities be-
tween those cases and the sperm whaling case.103 Japan and the Soviet
Union were certified for objecting to and exceeding the IWC Antarctic
minke whale quota for the 1973-74 season. 104 They objected to the minke
quota and then together exceeded it by 2,713 whales, 105 or approximately
fifty percent. After a series of unsatisfactory negotiations with the Japanese
and the Soviet Union, the Secretary of Commerce certified that both
countries had "exceeded the International Whaling Commission . . .
quotas for th[e] season, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the con-
servation program of the Commission. "106
because it has been applied consistently and with Congress' acknowledgement and acceptance, see
infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text. See also Haviland v. Butz, 543 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (courts' deference to agency interpretation commands even greater respect when "the case
involves the construction of a new statute by its implementing agency") (quoting Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,706 (D.C. Cir. 1974)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976).
But cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (Court's deference to executive practices stems
in part from many more years of congressional acquiescence than in the current case).
102. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
103. The appellate court in American Cetacean Soc'y did not address this or any other prior use of
either amendment. However, the district court did discuss the 1973 minke whale certification in its
opinion. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (D.D.C.), aff'd on
other grounds, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955).
104. E.g., Preparations for the 34th IWC, supra note 12, at 10 (Congressional Research Service
Report).
105. The President's Message to the Congress Submitting a Report on International Whaling
Operation and Conservation Programs, 11 WEEKLY COMp. PRns. Doc. 55-56 (Jan. 16, 1975) [here-
inafter cited as President's Message to Congress].
106. Letter from Secretary Dent to President Ford (Nov. 12, 1974) (certifying Japan and the
U.S.S.R. under the Pelly Amendment) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Certification Letter].
Despite his decision to certify, in the nextparagraph the Secretary advised against imposing the discre-
tionary Pelly Amendment sanctions prohibiting the import of Soviet and Japanese fish products because
these states had accepted new IWC conservation measures. The Secretary also stated that the two coun-
Washington Law Review
In a required follow-up message to Congress, 107 the President confirmed
that Japan and the Soviet Union were certified for exceeding the IWC
quota. In a carefully worded statement, the President observed that
"[wihether or not the objection [of Japan and the Soviet Union under the
Whaling Convention] is legal. . . does not alter the fact that exceeding the
quotas will diminish the effectiveness of the [IWC] program. It constitutes
a prima facie case for application of the Pelly Amendment." 108
At first glance, the present Japanese action appears similar to the 1974
incidents. 109 As in the 1974 incident, Japan has objected to an IWC quota.
The sperm whale quota was a severe reduction from the previous year"10
and the quota was consistent with United States policies."' Bilateral
negotiations began between Japan and the United States over the possibility
of certification, and during the negotiations Japan exceeded the IWC
quota. 112 On this superficial level, then, certification might be expected to
follow.
Closer analysis, however, reveals that the 1974 certifications are distin-
guishable and do not dictate certification now. Exceeding a quota may be a
"prima facie case for application of the Pelly Amendment," but the pre-
sumption is rebuttable. The Antarctic minke whale quota, exceeded in
tries "appeared to be more conciliatory than during previous meetings and, therefore, provided some
hope that all member nations would comply with the resolution and with the 1974-1975 quotas." Id.
These factors were crucial in the Secretary's recommendation against sanctions. "Since trade sanc-
tions would entail important domestic costs and could generate significant friction in our relations with
Japan and the U.S.S.R., such restrictions should be imposed only as a remedy of last resort after all rea-
sonable alternatives for the achievement of the conservation objective have proven ineffective. " Id. at 2.
He left open the possibility that subsequent actions by Japan and the Soviet Union might require a reas-
sessment.
The Secretary could have elected not to certify Japan and the U.S.S.R. in this case. However, since
the President could exercise discretion in applying sanctions under Pelly, the Secretary had no reason to
exercise discretion to avoid certification even though he believed sanctions were inappropriate.
107. The statute requires the President to notify Congress concerning whether he will impose sanc-
tions. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(b) (1982).
108. President's Message to Congress, supra note 105, at 55. The President also accepted the Sec-
retary's recommendation not to impose sanctions. He cited the same reasons provided to him in the let-
ter of certification. See infra note 125 for a discussion of the President's message.
109. Congress was reminded of the 1974 certifications on numerous occasions during hearings on
the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. See, e.g., Senate Hearing on Outlaw Whaling, supra note 77, at
27, 28 (statement of Tom Garrett, representing Defenders of the Wildlife). With full knowledge of how
the Pelly Amendment certification process had been used, Congress linked the process without altera-
tion to the mandatory sanctions to create the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. Congress thus in-
tended certification for situations similar to the events leading to the 1974 certification.
110. The quota was reduced from about 425 whales to zero. See supra note 29.
111. See Review ofthe 33dIWC, supra note 29, at 3 (staff report).
112. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (D.D.C.), aff'd on
other grounds, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Ameri-
can Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955).
654
Vol. 61:631, 1986
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments
1973, was based on a recommendation by the IWC Scientific Commit-
tee. 113 The 1984-85 quota for the North Pacific sperm whale stock (western
division) was not based on a Scientific Committee recommendation.1 4
Rather, the present quota was largely a political product.115 In fact, the
Scientific Committee declared that the small number of sperm whales that
the Japanese desired to take per year (400 for the first two seasons,
113. Reports conflict on this point. According to the Secretary of Commerce, the Scientific Com-
mittee proposed at the 1973 IWC meeting that a minke whale quota of 5000 whales for the Antarctic was
necessary to prevent the depletion of the stock. The quota, designed to protect the whale stock, was
based on the best available scientific judgment. Draft Report to Congress from Secretary Dent to Presi-
dent Ford (Nov. 12, 1974) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). The draft report, which ac-
companied the letter of certification, was the suggested text for the President's postcertification address
to Congress.
This description of the Scientific Committee's recommendation conflicts with an IWC report stating
that at the 1974 meeting the Scientific Committee was unable to make any recommendation concerning
an appropriate minke whale quota. Instead, according to the IWC report, the Committee advised only
that caution be used in setting the quota. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COM'N, 25TH REPoIr 65, (1975).
The version provided in the Draft Report, supra, is more pertinent to the American Cetacean case be-
cause it details the information actually used by the Secretary of Commerce in his decision to certify.
The Secretary apparently either disregarded or was unaware of the IWC report of the Committee's in-
ability to recommend a quota.
The recommendations of the Scientific Committee are usually given great weight by the IWC. See
supra note 12 for a discussion on the significance of the Scientific Committee's recommendations to the
IWC.
114. INTRNATIONAL WHALING COMM'N, 35T REPORT 70 (1985). The usual procedure for setting a
quota begins with a recommendation by the Scientific Committee for a maximum catch limit. See supra
note 12. However, the IWC Scientific Committee did not recommend the zero quota nor any other catch
limit for sperm whales. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMM'N, 35TH REPORT 70 (1985).
115. The zero quota was established for political reasons and not for substantiated concerns over
depletion of the stock. For example, the IWC Chairperson since 1982, Commissioner Iglesias (Argen-
tina), stated that in the absence of a recommendation by the Scientific Committee, votes on the sperm
whale quota would "necessarily be cast on political grounds." Review of the 34th IWC, supra note 95,
at 10 (staff report). Tom Garrett, the United States Deputy Commissioner to the IWC, testified that a
positive quota for sperm whales is "not politically in the cards no matter what the Scientific Committee
. . . recommends." Review of the 33dIWC, supra note 29, at 18.
The political nature of the sperm whale quota decision stems in part from the success of con-
servationist and preservationist forces in including nonwhaling countries in the IWC. For instance, be-
tween the 1980 and 1981 IWC meetings, conservationists successfully encouraged eight nonwhaling
countries to join the IWC. Id. at 28 (prepared statement of Mr. TomGarrett, United States Deputy Com-
missioner to the IWC). None of these nonwhaling countries opposed the zero quota. Id. at 11-12 (staff
report) (Twenty-five members voted for the quota. Only Japan voted against it. Ireland, the Peoples' Re-
public of China, and the Soviet Union abstained. India's commissioner was not present.). This shift in
IWC membership was a crucial factor in passing the zero sperm whale quota. Id. at 13-14 (staff report).
Representative Bonker, Chairperson of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Or-
ganizations, described the United States's policy on whaling as "a moral position rather than [one]
based on scientific data." Id. at 84. It is clear that the United States' position, as well as that of the IWC
majority, on the sperm whale quota issue did not have a scientific basis. Since Congress had been con-
cerned with the scientific realities of the possible extinction of whale species when it passed the Pelly
and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, see supra notes 53-60, 78 and accompanying text, violations
of IWC quotas which result in certification should be determined on a scientific basis.
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decreased to 200 for the next two) would not have a significant impact on
the sperm whale population. 116 In other words, the Scientific Committee
determined that the zero quota was not necessary to protect the stock.
In light of the Scientific Committee's conclusion on the minor impact of
the Japanese quota violation, Japan's present conduct is less harmful than
the conduct leading to the 1974 certifications. Japan has only minimally
exceeded the present quota and the potential consequences to the sperm
whale stock are of less gravity than in the minke case. In 1973 the Antarctic
minke whale population was estimated at between 150,000 and 299,999
whales," 7 the quota was 5,000 minke whales, and together Japan and the
Soviet Union exceeded the quota by over 2,700 whales. 118 The current
estimated sperm whale population for the North Pacific (western division)
is approximately 200,000.119 The sperm whale quota was zero, which the
Japanese exceeded by about 250 whales. 120 Even if Japan harvested the 400
whales in 1985 permitted by the United States-Japanese agreement, 12' the
loss would represent only a small fraction relative to both the total sperm
whale population 122 and the 1973 violation of the minke whale quota. 123
Taking 400 whales in 1985 did not endanger the sperm whale stock. 124
116. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMM'N, 35TH REPORT 70 (1985) ("[A]t least in the short term
(possibly up to 5 years) the current level of catch in the Japanese coastal fishery (catch limit of 400 last
year) would have only a small effect on the stock.").
117. The Scientific Committee had difficulty estimating the Antarctic minke population. The 1972
estimate of 150,000 + whales was revised upward in 1973 to 299,999. However, Dr. Chapman of the
Committee, an influencial scientist in the IWC, believed that the estimate was excessively high.
INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMM'N, 24TH REPORT 42 (1974).
118. See supra text accompanying note 105.
119. The Scientific Committee has experienced great difficulty estimating the North Pacific sperm
whale population. The Committee has not yet been able to make a reliable estimate or quota recommen-
dation to the Commission. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMM'N, 30TH REPORT 84 (1980). See
also supra note 114.
However, the most recent current (1982) stock size estimates are as follows:
Western North Pacific males (age 11 +): 61,000
females (age 10 +): 137,000
Eastern North Pacific males (age 13 +): 111,400
females (mature): 162,600
Gosho, Rice & Breiwick, The Sperm Whale, PhyseterMacrocephalus, 46 MARINE FIsHERIES REv. 54,
62 (1984).
120. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1415 (D.D.C.) (citing plain-
tiffs' reply memorandum), aff'd on other grounds, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub
nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955).
121. See supra note 2. The amount permitted by the agreement is one-half the amount that the Sci-
entific Committee said would have little effect on the sperm whale stock. See supra note 116.
122. A harvest of 400 whales in a year is.2 percent of the current best estimate of the Western North
Pacific sperm whale population. See supra note 119 for the population estimates.
123. The combined Japanese and Russian harvest in 1973 was 2.6 percent of the 1973 Antarctic
minke whale population estimate and 5.1 percent of the 1972 Antarctic minke whale population esti-
mate. See supra note 117 for the population estimates.
124. See supra note 116.
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Consequently the minke whale certifications do not evidence a past agency
practice of certification in situations similar to the current case. 1
25
2. Congressional Acquiescence in Agency Construction of the Pelly
Amendment After the Minke Whale Certifications
The American Cetacean court failed to explore agency practice under the
Pelly Amendment. 126 Past agency practice is relevant in this case, however.
The Department of Commerce's interpretation of the Pelly Amendment has
been consistent with Congress' intent that certification under the amend-
ment not be automatic for quota violations. In addition, through the House
whaling policy oversight subcommittee, 127 Congress has been periodically
125. Congress was informed of the 1974 certification, but the legislative history does not refer to
the crucial surrounding circumstances of the minke whale case. References to the 1974 certification in
the legislative history of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment mention little more than that Japan and
the Soviet Union were certified for objecting to and exceeding an IWC quota. See, e.g., Senate Hearing
on Outlaw Whaling, supra note 77, at 27, 28 (statement of Tom Garrett, representing Defenders of the
Wildlife); Preparationsfor the 34th IWC, supra note 12, at 10 (staff report).
Furthermore, both President Ford and the Secretary of Commerce appeared to assert that the mere act
of exceeding an IWC quota was sufficient for certification. See text accompanying notes 106 and 108.
Although the legislative and executive documents at first seem to indicate that Congress intended the
Secretary of Commerce to certify under the Pelly Amendment and later the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment countries that exceed a quota, closer analysis shows that the documents do not in fact sup-
port this proposition. The state of minke whales stocks in 1973 was well known. By 1973 commercial
whalers had depleted many whale populations and the IWC had only recently gained the cooperation of
many of its members in its efforts at responsible resource management. See supra note 19. Congress
was aware of the environment in which the certifications occurred, as evidenced by its support since
1972 of a complete commercial moratorium. Id. Exceeding any quota in 1973 was a significant "dimin-
ishing" because of the desperate state of so many whale stocks. Hence, even though the records of the
hearings on the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment appear to show that Congress was aware only that
exceeding the 1973 quota led to the 1974 certifications, Congress knew the 1974 certifications were the
result of whaling that directiy endangered the minke population. Therefore, neither the 1974 certifica-
tions nor their consideration by Congress during the Packwood-Magnuson hearings indicates that cer-
tification is mandated in the Japanese sperm whaling case.
The President and the Secretary of Commerce acted with similar background data. The proposed
draft report to Congress provided by the Secretary of Commerce emphasized the extent of the quota vio-
lation, the recommendation by the Scientific Committee, and other factors. Draft Report to Congress
from Secretary Dent to President Ford (Nov. 12, 1974) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
The Secretary's statements in the Certification Letter, supra note 106 and accompanying text, cannot be
considered independently of the context of the events leading to certification. The President's statement
that "exceeding the [minke whale] quota. . . constitutes a prima facie case for application of the Pelly
Amendment," President's Message to Congress, supra note 105, at 55, applied specifically to the
minke quota. This statement does not evidence executive intent that exceeding any quota constitutes a
prima facie case for certification.
126. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub
nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955).
127. The House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was the oversight committee for United States
whaling policy, with "primary authority over all endangered species and marine mammal issues and as
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informed of agency practice and has both acknowledged and accepted the
practice.
In a whaling policy and IWC oversight hearing on the proposed Pack-
wood-Magnuson Amendment before the whaling policy oversight subcom-
mittee, the United States commissioner to the IWC noted the discretionary
nature of Pelly in several remarks. First, he testified that in 1979, when
Chile, Peru, and South Korea were certified for flagrant and repeated
violations, 128 if mandatory sanctions had been in effect, the Secretary
might have declined to certify.129 This testimony was accepted without
comment by the subcommittee primarily responsible for overseeing United
States whaling policy and the implementation of fisheries legislation. 130
In the same hearing, the commissioner also stated that importing non-
member whale meat by a member nation diminished the effectiveness of
the IWC and that Japan had allowed these imports. 131 Yet, the Secretary of
Commerce had not certified Japan for this act in order to provide Japan the
opportunity to stop importing the meat. 132
This House subcommittee, which conducted most of the Packwood-
Magnuson hearings, accepted an interpretation of the Pelly Amendment
that allowed the Secretary of Commerce to exercise discretion in the
certification decision. Through the subcommittee, Congress was informed
of the Secretary of Commerce's exercise of discretion in the decision
whether to certify a country as "diminishing the effectiveness" of an
international conservation program. 133 Congress' acceptance of the prior
use of the Pelly Amendment demonstrates that Congress was concerned
with protecting whales from extinction or depletion, and not with certify-
ing countries for the mere technical offenses of objecting to and exceeding a
quota. 134 Congress gave the Secretary of Commerce discretion to decide
such has engaged in a continuing effort to assist in the conservation of whales." Oversight Hearing on
U.S. Whaling Policy, supra note 78, at 244 (statement of Chairperson Breaux). The subcommittee was,
in effect, the eyes of Congress for United States whaling policy, monitoring both congressional and ex-
ecutive practices. The subcommittee conducted the House hearings on both the Pelly and the Pack-
wood-Magnuson Amendments. Beginning in 1981, the Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs also shared in monitoring
whaling policy for several years.
128. See infra note 134.
129. Whaling Policy and IWC Oversight Hearing, supra note 24, at 313 (statement of Richard
Frank, Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce;
United States Commissioner to the IWC).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 324.
132. Id. at 322.
133. See supra note 127.
134. Congress reviewed other Pelly Amendment certifications during the hearings on the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. Peru, Chile, and the Republic of Korea were certified in 1978 for
conducting whaling activities outside the control of the IWC. The three countries were not IWC mem-
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when exceeding an IWC quota is serious enough to warrant certification
under the amendments.
3. Subsequent Action Under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
Since the passage of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment in 1979,
whaling activity has occurred that would have led to certification if the
decision were automatic and nondiscretionary. Instead, with one excep-
tion, the Secretary of Commerce has never chosen to certify. Although
several of these activities potentially had equal or greater impact on whale
stocks than Japan's present actions, and even though the whaling oversight
subcommittee was informed of the activities and the Secretary's response,
neither the subcommittee nor any other congressional body protested any
of the Secretary's decisions.
The first.incident involved Spanish whaling in 1980. At the 31st annual
IWC meeting, the commissioners set the Spain-Portugal-British Isles fin
whale stock catch limit for the 1980 season at 143, as recommended by the
Scientific Committee.135 Spain objected to the quota 36 and exceeded it by
approximately eighty percent. 137 After negotiating with Spain over the
possibility of certification under the amendments, the Secretary of Com-
merce chose not to certify Spain for its conduct. 138
Another incident in 1980 involved the Republic of Korea. In 1976,
following the recommendation of the Scientific Committee, the IWC
granted the endangered North Pacific fin whale stock protected status and
bers and they persistently exceeded quotas by large amounts for several endangered whale stocks.
Whaling Policy and IWC Oversight Hearing, supra note 24, at 312. President Carter reported to Con-
gress that the frequent and significant violations of IWC quotas were the basis for the certifications of
these countries. President's Message to Congress Transmitting a Report, 15 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc.
265,266-67 (1979). Other documents state that the reason for certification was their refusal to join the
IWC. Preparations for the 34th IWC, supra note 12, at 11 "(staff report). In either case, the countries
were diminishing the effectiveness of the IWC by whaling outside its supervision and control.
This situation is different from the sperm whaling controversy. Japan is acting entirely within its
rights under the IWC. Whether due to the egregious nature of their violations or their anti-IWC stance,
the certification of Peru, Chile, and Korea therefore provides little additional insight into congressional
intentions with regard to the sperm whaling case.
135. INTERNATIONAL WHALNG COMM'N, 30TH REPORT 29 (1980).
136. INTERNATIONAL WHAUNG COMM'N, 31sTREPoRT6 n.* (1981).
137. Hearing and Markup on Preparationsfor the 33dAnnual Meeting oftheIWCBefore the Sub-
comm. on Human Rights and International Organizations of theHouse Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1981) (statement of Mr. Craig Van Note, Executive Vice President, Monitor) [here-
inafter cited as Preparations for the 33dIWC]. Furthermore, many of the whales taken by Spain were
undersized. Review of the 33dlWC, supra note 29, at 45 (statement of Mr. Tom Garrett, United States
Deputy Commissioner to the IWC).
138. Spain agreed to abide by the quota, even though evidence suggests that it subsequently ex-
ceeded the limits. Review of the 33dIWC, supra note 29, at 43 (statement of Mr. Tom Garrett, United
States Deputy Commissioner to the 1WC).
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set a zero quota. 139 According to the best available evidence, the Republic
of Korea harvested these protected whales at an average rate of over thirty a
year. 140 Korea also attempted to obstruct IWC monitoring of its whaling by
misreporting its take of fin whales.141 After negotiations with Korea, the
Secretary of Commerce did not certify Korea for its violations.
Chile committed several violations of IWC regulations during the
1980-81 seasons as evidenced by processed meat found on its factory
ships 142 which themselves were used in contravention of a total ban. 143 The
ban and the quotas that Chile violated were binding on Chile because Chile
had never objected to them. 144 Even here, the Secretary of Commerce did
not certify Chile for any of these activities. 145
The first certification of whaling activities after the passage of the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment did not come until 1985. The Secretary
certified the Soviet Union in March 1985 for objecting to and exceeding its
Antarctic minke whale quota of 1941 by about 500 whales.146 Japan also
objected to its Antarctic minke quota but did not exceed it. It was not
certified. 147
In all these cases the Secretary of Commerce consistently interpreted the
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments as allowing discretion in
the certification decision. 148 Congress, through the whaling oversight
139. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMM'N, 27TH REPORT 8 (1977). Protected status is granted to en-
dangered stocks, which require complete protection from exploitation. Id. at 6.
140. See Review of the 33dlWC, supra note 29, at 38; Review of the 34th IWC, supra note 95, at
96.
141. Review of the 34th IWC, supra note 95, at 96. Korea had apparently been reporting its take of
fin whales as Bryde's whales, a managed but unprotected stock for which the IWC has established a
quota of 19 per year.
142. Preparations for the 33dIWC, supra note 137, at 38. The principal evidence of this violation
was processed whale meat that Chile sold to Japan, but authorities were unable to identify the species
from this evidence.
143. Id. at 23 (statement of Mr. Craig Van Note, Executive Vice President, the Monitor Con-
sortium).
144. See generally supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
145. Chile may not have been certified because the sanctions of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments could not affect Chile since it neither fished in United States waters nor sold fish to the
United States. See Review of the 33dIWC, supra note 29, at 58 (statement of Rep. Bonker).
146. N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1985, at A8, col. 3. The Secretary of Commerce certified the Soviet
Union on April 3rd.
147. Id.
148. Certification under the amendments has been rejected in other incidents, all with the knowl-
edge of Congress. In 1980 Taiwan allegedly violated an IWC ban on the use of factory ships to harvest
other than minke whales and allegedly exceeded IWC quotas. The United States threatened to certify
Taiwan for these activities, but certification never occurred because of Taiwan's conciliatory conduct
after the negotiations. See Preparations for the 34th IWC, supra note 12, at 11.
Allegations also were made before Congress that Portugal had taken several hundred sperm whales
annually while not a member of the IWC. Review of the 33dIWC, supra note 29, at 58. No action was
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subcommittee, was periodically informed of this interpretation and ac-
cepted it in each case. 149
taken.
A different type of violation involved the nonexplosive (cold) harpoon ban. The IWC banned the use
of cold harpoons for humanitarian reasons. INTERNATiONAL WHALING COMM'N, 31sT REPORT 25 (198 1).
Cold harpoons inflict an unnecessarily cruel and often extended death on whales. Id. Five countries ob-
jected to this ban: Brazil, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and the Soviet Union. See OversightHearing on U.S.
Whaling Policy, supra note 78, at 258 (statement of Dr. John Byrne, Administrator, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration). A congressional staff report asserted that these countries should be
certified and that the failure to do so would seriously weaken the effectiveness of the amendments. Re-
view of the 34thf WC, supra note 95, at 24. Only Japan has complied with the ban. See OversightfHear-
ing on U.S. Whaling Policy, supra note 78, at 258 (statement of Dr. John Byrne, Administrator,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration).
149. The court did not consider prior agency practice in applying the amendments. Instead it con-
cluded that characterization of prior practice did not present a genuine issue of material fact because it
found no indications that the prior practice had been accepted, or even acknowledged, by Congress.
American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426,440 n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom.
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 955).
The district court in American Cetacean Soc'y did consider agency past practice. However, it mis-
construed that practice by finding that the Executive's interpretation and application of the amendments
consistently resulted in certification for violations of IWC quotas. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Bal-
dridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1407 (D.D.C.), aff'don other grounds, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. granted sub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 787 (1986) (Nos.
85-954, 955). The district court, however, totally ignored the amendments' role in the quota violations
detailed supra notes 134-48 and accompanying text. Since 1980, with one exception, IWC quota viola-
tions have not resulted in certification.
The district court relied on several inappropriate or misconstrued sources to support its position that
the Secretary consistently certified whale quota violations. It referred to statements by government of-
ficials on the Pelly Amendment to illustrate its view of the government's certification policy. The first
quotation, from an unnamed State Department official during an undisclosed House hearing in 1971,
stated that the United States would apply trade restrictions to a state violating an international salmon
quota. Id. at 1406. The next reference was to a 1971 Department of Commerce letter that only described,
without comment, the Pelly Amendment. Id. Neither reference indicated that the Executive intended to
certify every violation of an IWC quota.
The court then considered the 1979 testimony of an official that three non-IWC members who had
flagrantly violated IWC quotas (Peru, Chile, and the Republic of Korea) were certified under the Pelly
Amendment. The official also stated that the Pelly Amendment would apply to a significant violation of
a quota. Id. The court felt these statements demonstrated that the Executive has consistently intended to
certify a state for exceeding an IWC quota. The court claimed to be "struck by the consistency and clar-
ity of the [Executive's] position." Id. at 1407. The court was grasping for evidence; the quoted testi-
mony in fact does not support the court's interpretation of the Executive's position. Rather, the
testimony supports the existence of discretion in the certification decision: the amendment applies to
flagrant and serious violations; the Secretary of Commerce must determine which violations are suffi-
ciently serious to merit certification.
Next, the court misapplied Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978), a case involving the tak-
ing of Bering Sea bowhead whales by Alaska natives. American Cetacean Soc'y, 608 F. Supp. at
1407-08. Bowhead whales are one of the most endangered whale species, yet the IWC has usually al-
lowed a small number to be taken each year by Alaska natives because of the important role that whaling
has traditionally played in Eskimo culture.
In 1977, however, the IWC followed a recommendation by the Scientific Committee to set a zero
quota for the year. The United States did not object to the quota. The Eskimos filed suit to compel the
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IV. CONCLUSION
Examination of the language, the legislative history, and the past use of
the Pelly and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendments demonstrates that
Congress did not require the Secretary of Commerce to certify a country for
exceeding an IWC quota. Congress intended the amendments to address
whaling practices that endanger whale species, not whaling activities that
technically violate IWC quotas but lack significant harmful effects. Con-
gress gave the Secretary of Commerce discretion and flexibility to deter-
mine whether a whaling violation was significant enough to require cer-
tification. The Secretary's past interpretation and use of the amendments
has consistently demonstrated his discretionary powers. The amendments
do not mandate certification of Japan's current sperm whaling because this
whaling does not endanger whale stocks. Furthermore, the Secretary
properly exercised his judgment by withholding certification.
The court in American Cetacean misconstrued the amendments when it
determined that certification was automatic and nondiscretionary in this
Secretary of State to do so. The district court noted statements of administrators that the United States
must scrupulously observe IWC quotas in order to maintain its leadership in whale conservation, and
that a United States' objection to the obviously necessary bowhead quota would have a devastating ef-
fect on the future effectiveness of the IWC. The court then interpreted these statements to show that the
Executive's desire to maintain the United States' leadership role in the IWC requires the Secretary to
certify all whaling in violation of an IWC quota. Id. at 1407. This interpretation does not follow from
the statements. The United States' interest in maintaining its leadership role in the conservation move-
ment and its reluctance to object to the bowhead quota do not demonstrate a government position
against discretion in an entirely separate matter, the certification decision.
TheAmerican Cetacean court also failed to distinguish the facts of the bowhead case from the current
case. The opinion stated that if the taking of 15 or 20 bowhead whales is "a threat to the entire IWC
structure, the Court cannot see how the taking of. . . [whales according to the terms of the November
agreement] could possibly be countenanced." Id. at 1407-08.
In fact, the situations were very different. The Bering Sea bowhead whale is one of the most seriously
endangered of all whale stocks. At the 1979 IWC meeting, the Scientific Committee reported that the
only safe quota for the bowhead whale was zero and that the population would continue to decline even
in the absence of any whaling. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMM'N, 30TH REPORT 30 (1980). The Com-
mittee's estimate of the remaining Bering Sea bowhead population was less than 2300 whales. Id. at
103.
The status of the North Pacific sperm whale stock is not so precarious. See supra notes 114-16, 119
and accompanying text. Northwest Pacific sperm whales are not endangered and the small number of
whales taken by the Japanese will have little effect.
Finally, the court attempted to bolster its argument with an unofficial letter from the Secretary of
Commerce to Senator Packwood in July, 1984. The correspondence addressed only the future IWC
commercial moratorium. The Secretary stated in the letter that "any continued commercial whaling af-
ter the IWC moratorium decision takes effect would be subject to certification." American Cetacean
Soc'y, 604 F. Supp. at 1408. The court found this statement to be inconsistent with the November agree-
ment. This is technically correct since the agreement allows Japanese whaling to continue for two sea-
sons after the moratorium begins. However, since the most important goal of United States whaling
policy is to have the moratorium go into effect, two seasons of low-level Japanese whaling after the mor-
atorium begins pale in significance next to Japan's acceptance of the moratorium. The present agree-
ment is thus consistent with the tenor of the Secretary's letter.
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case. The court also ignored the history and past agency interpretation of
the amendments, overlooking the many incidents of uncertified whaling
violations since the passage of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment.
Those incidents illustrate that Packwood-Magnuson certification, like
Pelly certification, is not automatic. The court in American Cetacean
overstepped its role by ordering certification of Japan.
Erin K. Flory
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